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There is no reason to believe that the Stoics paid more attention to children, 
either in theory or in practice, than other philosophers in antiquity. They 
expressed interest in and affection for children in general; they mentioned the 
behavior of infants and children frequently; they wrote books and letters of 
advice to their own children, and spoke about parental, filial, and familial 
duties. But so did many other philosophers. There is no evidence that Stoics 
wrote books specifically about children, or thought that they should write 
such books. This seems a bit odd, given the fascinating outline of child psy-
chology they provided, and especially given that they regularly wrote whole 
books specifically about other psychological matters, as well as marriage, love, 
the equality of women, and many other issues. 
There is evidence, however, that the Stoics paid better attention than their 
rivals did to observing, describing, and making theoretical use of the behavior 
of children, because they gave us a subtle and powerful developmental psychol-
ogy-an account that begins with acute observations of the behavior of in-
fants and very young children. These observations are remarkably well con-
firmed by modern psychology, and provide a persuasive causal account of moral 
motivation as well as an intriguing account of the relation between reason 
and emotion. 
In addition, it may be possible to argue that their accounts of moral moti-
vation, reason, and emotion implicitly commit Stoics to a much more robust 
and nuanced respect for children than seems to have been common in antiq-
uity. This is so because, on the Stoic account of things, the sequence of events 
that leads from infancy to healthy maturity {and the possibility of virtue} can 
be defeated at crucial points very early in life, in ways that make recovery 
difficult if not hopeless. Moreover, the developmental theory they proposed 
implied that to prevent such damage, one could not simply rely on didactic 
training, or wait until a youngster was ready for dialectical instruction; nor 
could one simply rely on the knowledge and habits that would be absorbed in 
a good polis to prepare the young for moral philosophy. Much more active 
intervention was necessary. The Stoics thus arguably had more urgent theo-
retical reasons than their rivals for insisting that adults pay close, patient, and 
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persistent attention to the early health, security, and education of the young. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the Stoics recognized those implications of 
their theory. 
It also seems reasonable to assume that they recognized the contribution 
made by their developmental child psychology both to the form of ethical 
universalism for which they have been much admired, and to the powerful 
forms of psychotherapy with which they have been identified in popular con-
sciousness. It is much less clear whether they also recognized the fact that 
their moral psychology committed them to being vigilant about all forms of 
what we would now label racism, sexism, and elitism, as well as giving them a 
challenging standard for assessing child neglect. And of course they could not 
have anticipated that an outline of early childhood education derived from 
their work would sound thoroughly contemporary to 20th century ears. 
Whatever one may suppose about the justice of depicting the Stoic sage as 
a grim, dispassionate person capable mostly of enduring pain, it is clear that 
the Stoics did not expect children to cultivate such characteristics directly. 
On the Stoic view of things, infants and children up to the age of about four-
teen were constituted very differently than adults. It is the developmental 
story the Stoics told about how children are gradually transformed into adults 
that gives their views about children special philosophical interest. 
Two Quick Preliminaries 
Bibliographical Caution 
For five hundred years, from roughly 300 BCE to 200 CE, Stoic philosophers 
were a leading influence in Hellenistic and Roman intellectual life. They were 
prolific writers, revered teachers, and above all systematic thinkers who made 
profound, lasting contributions to what we now call metaphysics, logic, phi-
losophy of language, moral psychology, ethics, and political philosophy. They 
insisted that each of these fields was intimately connected to the others, and 
that making theoretical mistakes anywhere would compromise their entire 
enterprise. Some of their contributions, such as their invention of ['roposi-
tionallogic, were misreported and misunderstood until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury. Their ethics, however, which was the primary source of their fame and 
influence in antiquity, was widely and consistently reported, and even though 
most of the texts are fragmentary, what remains is of significant philosophical 
interest. There is thus no excuse for the desiccated version of stoic ethics that 
plagues unreflective modern references to it, despite the persistent efforts of 
Hellenists to remind us of its riches. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that any attempt to describe Stoic doc-
trines, even ethical doctrines, will be an exercise in reconstructing arguments 
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from a scanty written record. None of the 700 books reportedly written by 
Chrysippus, the central figure of the Early Stoa, has survived; nor have any of 
Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school. Indeed, none of the works from the 
Early and Middle Stoas has survived intact. The lists of titles of such books, 
given by Diogenes Laertius, are tantalizing. l (As remarked above, there are no 
works mentioned that seem to be specifically on children, although works on 
impulses, emotion, love, and marriage are there.) Cicero evidently had access 
to many of these books, and he knew and studied with major figures of the 
Middle Stoa. But the books themselves survive only in shards of quotation 
and description-often from writers hostile to them and to stoicism generally. 
The texts we now have to work with are these: (1) roughly half of Arrian's 
record of Epictetus' teachings, four of the eight books of his Discourses of 
Epictetus having been lost, and the Enchiridion having been drawn from the 
Discourses; (2) works by Seneca who, while a committed Stoic, was in his own 
estimation an unsystematic literary expositor; (3) Marcus Aurelius' unsystem-
atic and unfinished Meditations; (4) the very useful summaries of Stoic ethical 
doctrines given by Cicero, who was not himself a Stoic but who respected 
them, and who freely helped himself to their views (Book III of De Finibus is 
the best of these texts for our purposes); (5) Diogenes Laertius' somewhat less 
helpful summaries in Book VII of his Lives of the Phi/oso/Jhers; (6) a fragment of 
a handbook or digest of Stoic ethics from the early second century BCE, writ-
ten by Hierocles; (7) a scattered array of quotation, paraphrase, summary, an-
nouncement, and comment in other ancient (nonstoic) writers. The standard 
source in Englbh for these fragments is now volume 1 of The Hellenistic Phi-
losophers, edited by AA Long and D.N. Sedley.2 
Beginning in the 1950s, a steadily increasing stream of philosophically im-
portant scholarship on Stoic texts has poured forth-a stream that now runs 
swift, clear, and deep. It includes both important restatements of Stoic doc-
trine and philosophical assessments of its cogency, though as yet very little of 
it deals directly with children. A small portion of the current literature is cited 
in the footnotes here, and readers can find their way into much more of it, 
with particular ease, through the text and references in several works listed in 
the bibliography: Annas, The Morality of Hap/Jiness; Long, Stoic Studies; 
Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire; Schofield and Striker, eds., The Norms of 
Nature; and in the bibliographic commentaries to various chapters of Becker, 
A New Stoicism. 
A Reminder about Stoic Naturalism 
The Stoics typically divided the philosophical enterprise into three parts. Physics 
was roughly what we would now call a mixture of science, metaphysics, and 
theology; logic was roughly epistemology, philosophy of language, formal and 
/ 
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philosophical logic; ethics was defined broadly enough to include metaethics, 
ethical theory, casuistry, moral counseling, psychotherapy, and social, politi-
cal, and legal philosophy. It seems fair to say that the Stoics expected to be 
able to derive their ethical theory from facts about the natural world-from 
physics, as it were-by way of logic. There is no parallel, in their ethical theo-
rizing, to the modern preoccupation with logical gaps between facts and val-
ues, description and prescription, values and norms. This is so because they 
believed that Nature as a whole (the universe; God) was a purposive, rational 
being of which humans were a proper part, and that the ultimate or final hu-
man good was obviously to be found in perfecting themselves as such a part-
which amounted to perfecting their own human nature. Living consistently 
or "conformably" with human nature would a fortiori mean living in accor-
dance with the grand scheme of things. It would mean "following" Nature 
with a capital N. Thus while in principle Stoic ethical theory depended upon 
getting all of the physics right (all of facts about the world), as a practical 
matter Stoics often proceeded by focusing on facts about human nature. 3 
This commitment to getting the facts about human nature right led the 
Stoics to pay close attention to human biology and psychology. This some-
times had comical results, as when Chrysippus argued that the heart and not 
the brain was the seat of consciousness-an argument ridiculed at length by 
Galen.4 But it also produced a subtle and inspiring moral psychology-and 
more to the point here, a developmental psychology that made ethical theory 
heavily dependent on an account of infancy and childhood. The Stoics in-
sisted that it was only through a proper understanding of the normal course of 
human development, from the earliest stages of life to the end, that one could 
construct a sound ethical theory. Their insistence on this point was notorious. 
Plutarch, for example, says in exasperation, 
Why then again for heaven's sake in every book on physics and ethics does he 
[Chrysippus) weary us to death in writing that we have an appropriate disposi-
tion relative to ourselves as soon as we are born and to our parts and our off-
spring?'" 
Let us see why. 
Child Psychology 
The Cradle Argument, Oikeiosis, and Moral Development 
The Stoic theory of moral development begins with a thesis about the behav-
ior of infants in the cradle-a thesis Stoics advanced in opposition to the 
Epicurean account of the same matters.6 Epicureans insisted that the sover-
eign motivation of infants was to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and that this 
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was (yet more) evidence for thinking that pleasure was, by our very nature, 
the ultimate or final human good. Such an inference is only plausible, of course, 
if one assumes that human development does not radically transform or elimi-
nate infant behavior but is rather a matter of growth and maturation-growth 
in the form of increasing size, complexity, capacity, power, knowledge, refine-
ment, and organization; maturation in the form of the preprogrammed emer-
gence from time to time of added powers, such as language or reproductive 
ability, that are characteristic of adults. (And one gets the impression from the 
texts that not only the Epicureans but all the philosophers in antiquity except 
the Stoics thought of development in more or less that way.) But the Stoics 
rejected both the pleasure/pain account of infant motivation and the growth/ 
maturation account of development. This is the key to their moral psychology 
and to the central role child psychology plays in their ethical theory. 
On the Stoic account, infants in the cradle are motivated primarily by their 
attachment to and "affection" for themselves-attachment and affection that 
show themselves in behavior aimed at self-preservation and the satisfaction of 
"impulses" of many sorts. Primal impulses may not even include pleasure seek-
ing at all. Cicero says the Stoics insisted on this point. (See the quotation in 
note 7 below.) But it was certainly clear to them that infants often subordi-
nated pleasure-seeking to other pursuits such as efforts to move, to explore 
their environment, to observe, respond, mimic and learn. This complexity, 
the Stoics thought, was simply an undeniable observation about infant behav-
ior. They believed that the obvious explanation for such behavior was that 
infants had a primitive consciousness of themselves and their interests, and a 
built-in affection (appropriate disposition) for preserving themselves and sat-
isfying all of their interests.? Thus the Stoics held that the Epicurean version 
of the cradle argument was unsound if for no other reason than that its premise 
about primal impulses was false. 
The situation was worse than that, however, not only for Epicureans but for 
any ethical theorist who assumed that human psychological development was 
primarily a matter of growth and maturation. The Stoics held that psychological 
development was self-transfonnative in a predictable way. Indeed, one could read 
them as stage theorists about cognitive development. In their view, mature hu-
man beings were fundamentally different creatures from immature ones. (Re-
call Seneca's remark, quoted in note 7, that infants, young adults, and the old 
each have different "constitutions.") And they held, against the Aristotelians, 
that habituation was not the fundamental mechanism of character formation. 
Rather, they thought that the fundamental mechanism was oikeiosis. 8 
The term oikeiosis is hard to put into English. It has sometimes been trans-
lated as familiarization, because it has the same root as house or family. But it 
is probably better translated as attachment, incorporation, or appropriation. I 
will follow Long and Sedley in using the English term appropriation for it.~ 
/ 
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Here is how the developmental process goes, according to the Stoics. Chil-
dren grow and mature, of course, as other philosophers routinely noted in 
passing. Newborns have a small array of crude, primal impulses and very lim-
ited powers. Infants and children increase in size and physical strength; their 
powers oflocomotion and perception increase; they accumulate memories from 
a wider and wider range of experience; new powers {notably language} and 
new impulses {such as an urge for reproduction} are added to their repertoires 
as they ripen into adolescence and adulthood-and some are subtracted as 
adults move through middle and old age; children acquire useful habits of 
inquiry, inference, and conduct, which they refine through trial and error; 
they generalize, hypothesize, observe outcomes, and acquire a more or less 
theoretical understanding of things, and eventually they may come to see that 
practical wisdom requires them to be just, courageous, temperate, benevo-
lent-in a word, virtuous. But that is only what is happening on the surface, as 
it were. What the Stoics offer in addition to these conventional observations 
about growth and maturation is an account of the psychodynamics of human 
development-an account of the causal story, at a psychological level, that 
leads from infancy through childhood to adulthood. 
Oikeiosis is the psychological mechanism that the Stoics put at the center 
of this causal explanation. It works this way.lO Early in infancy children's natu-
ral affection for themselves is extended to external physical objects and states 
that are {or appear to them to be} instrumental to satisfying their primal im-
pulses. Infants acquire an affection for the breasts that feed them; comfortable 
positions in which they are held; interesting or pleasurable motions, sounds, 
smells, sensations; certain cloths and toys; certain faces, and expressions on 
those faces; the very cradle itself. These things are "perceived" in a primitive 
way as extrinsically or instrumentally valuable. Then a fundamentally impor-
tant transformation occurs. Infants and very young children soon begin to 
"appropriate" these useful objects psychologically-making the external things 
"their own," as it were, in a way that makes the affection for them like the natural 
affection the infants have for themselves. This makes the infants disposed to pre-
serve {and act for} the external things in the same way they are disposed to 
preserve and act for themselves. Thus the initial, conditional affection for the 
things as means to ends is converted, through oikeiosis, into an affection that is 
quite independent of perceptions of a thing's instrumental worth. It does not 
matter that the breast is dry, the brightly colored object is dulled, the blanket 
is no longer warm, the cradle is no longer big enough. Insofar as we have 
"appropriated" such things, we have affection for them in themselves, for their 
own sakes. They have intrinsic value for us. {We often develop strong attach-
ments to them also, and the proper management of attachments is a central 
theme of Stoic ethics.} 
----
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An even bigger change occurs when children acquire language and begin 
to represent states of affairs and causal connections to themselves, and to gen-
eralize, hypothesize, and make rules about how to get what they want. The 
same two-step process occurs here as well, with dramatic consequences. Chil-
dren first develop an affection for the beliefs and inferences that are instru-
mental {the ones that work; the "correct" ones}, just because those are the 
ones that work. A similar affection arises for rule-following behavior that is 
successful. Then, through oikeiosis, children at a surprisingly early age begin to 
appropriate their useful beliefs, generalizations, rules, and expectations-and 
thus to convert affection for the instrumental worth of such things into affec-
tion for the things in themselves. Children thus come to have an affection for 
true belief, correct conduct, and rule-following for its own sake, quite inde-
pendent of its usefulness. This is, moreover, a recursive process. Beliefs are 
repeatedly modified in the light of new experience. Inconsistencies are re-
peatedly dealt with in order to make it possihle for conduct to conform to all 
the beliefs one has. Children thus come to value regional coherence or consis-
tency as well as local correctness-first for instrumental reasons, and then 
through oikeiosis, for its own sake. 
The penultimate step comes with the realization of the instrumental value 
of practical intelligence itself, and the attendant affection that children de-
velop for doing things correctly {in the right way, for the right reasons}. This 
is quite distinct from the ever present affection for getting the desired out-
come. The novice archer wants to hit the target, certainly, hut comes to ap-
preciate that the most reliahle way to get that result is hy making the shot cor-
rectly. And this lesson, once learned in a few contexts, is generalized into an 
affection for procedure, technique, skill, and practical intelligence of all sorts. 
Affection for the usefulness of these things is then also transformed, through 
oikeiosis, into an affection for them that is quite independent of their utility. 
Children come to value, for its own sake, doing things in the right way for the 
right reasons. 
The final step {plausihly the step into full maturity, though this character-
ization of it is not fully explicit in the texts} comes from the cultivation of 
practical intelligence, once we love it both for its utility and for its own sake. 
We see that hitting the target {getting many of the things we want} is not 
ultimately within our control, and not within our control at all except though 
the {correct} exercise of our practical intelligence. Getting that much right 
{perfecting our ahility to do the right thing in the right way} thus becomes our 
paramount concern in every context. At first, of course, we want this merely 
as a means to our other ends. But we quite naturally appropriate it as well, and 
through oikeiosis, come to have a paramount concern for perfecting the exer-
cise of our practical intelligence for its OU'7l sake. 
/ 
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The connection of all of this to ethical theory is that the Stoics identified 
this final stage with the pursuit of virtue. Virtue, they held, was for humans 
the perfection of reason, where what is meant by reason is perhaps better ex-
pressed by the notion of the perfection of the exercise of our agency via prac-
tical intelligence. Stoics notoriously insisted that virtue was the only good; 
that it was sufficient for happiness; and that it was an all or nothing thing. 
Those hard doctrines need not detain us here. 
There are, however, several remarkable things about the oikeiosis-driven 
account of childhood moral development that require comment. 
First, the account is put forward as the typical, natural sequence of events 
for children-something that will inevitably occur in favorable circumstances, 
given the sort of constitution human infants and children have. Virtue, as the 
culmination of this process, is thus equally possible for males and females, 
slaves and freemen, nobles and peasants-unless something in the circum-
stances of a given group systematically defeats the normal course of develop-
ment for its members. Moreover, since the deliberate imposition of such 
"defeaters" would be an act in opposition to nature, Stoics were theoretically 
committed to rejecting any form of sexism, racism, slavery, or elitism that 
imposed developmental defeaters. There is ample evidence that Stoics regu-
larly saw and acted on some of these implications. They admitted women to 
the Stoa and gave arguments for their equality.ll They recognized the cosmo-
politan implications of their theory. The leaders and pupils of the Stoa were as 
likely to be drawn from the ranks of ordinary citizens as from an elite. One of 
their most famous teachers (Epictetus) had been a slave in Rome-indeed 
had studied with a Stoic teacher while enslaved. And it is certainly clear from 
Marcus Aurelius' musings that he did not think his being Roman Emperor 
gave him special access to virtue. 
Second, the Stoic account of moral development is about the way things 
go for infants and children who are healthy and well-cared for by adults. The 
Stoics were ViVidly aware of the ways in which deformities, ill-health, or abuse 
could interfere with the process. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that 
they would have been aware that their theory gave them both a way of setting 
a standard against child neglect and abuse, and of setting up a rather detailed 
curriculum for the educational system. I will not attempt to trace out these 
implications for child care and education here, except to point out how con-
gruent they will be with the sort of state-endorsed (as opposed to state-permit-
ted) policies common in developed liberal democracies. Good parenting and 
good education in both settings are fundamentally directed at enabling chil-
dren to become healthy, autonomous, broadly capable, and effective agents 
who not only pursue their own vision of the good life but who are reciprocally 
tolerant, cooperative, and benevolent towards others who have significantly 
different conceptions of the good life. Limitations on a child's freedom, and 
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affirmative duties to provide for a child's physical and psychological well-he-
ing, are in both cases assessed in terms of these developmental goals. And in 
both cases it is assumed that if children develop in the normal way within 
such a framework for child care and education, and if subsequently those indi-
viduals as adults continue to have reasonahly favorahle circumstances for ex-
ercising their agency, that satisfactory progress toward individual virtue and a 
just society will follow as a matter of course. 
Third, on the Stoic account, the infant's natural, initial focus on self-pres-
ervation and self-interest for its own sake is very quickly supplemented hy an 
equally natural focus on the needs and interests of others, as ends in them-
selves. Various fragments, notahly one now attrihuted to Hierocles,12 suggest 
that some Stoics might have thought that oikeiosis worked along two tracks. 
One had its roots in the infant's primal affection for itself; the other had its 
roots in an equally primal, non instrumental affection for other human heings. 
The latter, "social" affection then hecame the source for the workings of "so-
cial oikeiosis"-the process hy which this affection for others as ends in them-
se lves is refmed (distinguishing friends from foes, for example), and is extended 
from local to regional and ultimately universal scope. It is not clear that all 
Stoics held this two-track view, however. And it is an empirical question as to 
whether such a primal social affection is part of our repertoire. But it is clear 
that nothing in Stoic ethical theory will hang on the answer to that empirical 
question. For even if the social impulse is not primal, it is clear that in the 
normal course of events it will quickly arise through non-social oikeiosis, and 
then he refined and extended. Moreover, hoth tracks inevitably lead to forms 
of impartiality and reciprocity that ground principles of justice. ll 
Impulse, Representation, Belief, Emotion, anJ Rationality 
The transformation of our motivational structure wrought hy oikeiosis is dramatic, 
and central to ethics. But the Stoics thought that there was a yet more fundamen-
tal sort of transformation produced hy the deVl'lopment of our pOWl'rs of reason. 
This second sort of transformation also had to do with motivation, and was 
fundamental to the doctrine that has become synonymous with stoicism in 
modern popular consciousness-namely, the "extirpation of the passions."14 
Explicating this aspect of Stoic theory is difficult, however. In part, this is due 
to the fact that the texts are more than usually scanty. But matters are not made 
any easier hy the fact that the texts we have are silent on the causal principle 
involved in the transformation: we have nothing to work with in this context 
that is comparahle to the notion of oikeiosis. Rather, we are simply presented 
with assertions ahout the end result, and left to guess what the mechanism of the 
transformation is. Moreover, Stoics disagreed among themselves abollt the 
nature of the transfnrmation. So what follows is necessarily quite speculative. II 
/ 
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It is clear enough that leaders of the Early Stoa, especially Chrysippus, vig-
orously opposed the Platonic conception of mind or soul. For one thing, the 
Stoics were always thoroughgoing materialists, and in their view mental events 
were physical objects. That alone put them at odds with Plato, not to mention 
in opposition to what we now call substance dualists of all sorts. But more to 
the point here, the Stoics rejected the notion that the mind of a mature hu-
man being was organized into separate faculties, functioning more or less au-
tonomously, and each capable by itself of causing a person to act. 
The emphasis in the preceding phrase is needed to avoid confusion. Stoics 
regularly used the language of mental faculties-speaking, for example, of "the 
commanding part" of the soul (reason), in opposition to impulses, emotions, 
or passions. But they held that once reason develops sufficiently, it always 
plays a decisive role in determining human conduct. In particular, they re-
jected Plato's tripartite conception of the soul, at least insofar as it was com-
mitted to the view that our appetitive or "spirited" parts could be the immedi-
ate causes of action in an adult. Presumably the Stoics would have had the 
same objection to all the successors to Plato's conception-including its re-
cent Counterparts in various versions of Freudian theory-though of course 
they would have been ultimately committed to accepting the best science on 
the matter. Similarly, they probably would have had difficulties with current 
theories of the modularity of mind. 
What the Stoics offered instead was again a developmental account-one 
in which the gradual development of rationality, from infancy through child-
hood, ultimately transformed the mind in a fundamental way. The central 
feature of such development, they thought, was the way belief transformed 
impulse, affect, emotion, and passion. Here we must begin to interpolate and 
speculate to a significant extent. But the following seems plausible. 
In infants, impulses and affective states are either spontaneous or a matter 
of reflex. They can be highly differentiated-stimulus and response-specific, as 
in the case of fear of a particular sound; quite generalized, as in fear of any dark 
bedroom; or generalized to the extent of a fundamental temperament (basic 
anxiety). But in the normal course of cognitive development, children begin to 
represent such experience propositionally, then to believe some and reject other 
Propositions about the experience, and finally to "assent" to certain beliefs in 
a way that makes those beliefs the immediate causal determinants of action. 
Once that happens, the causal sequence that generates impulses and affective 
states can be reversed: such things can then be the consequences of beliefs, and 
be differentiated by the cognitive content of those beliefs. (Ghost stories about 
dark bedrooms can raise goose bumps.) Moreover, in the normal course of 
development, the practice of representing experience, and of assenting to beliefs 
about it, becomes relentless and pervasive for the child. This then has perva-
sive consequences for the occurrence and nature of our affective states. More 
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and more of them will be, as it were, supervenient upon our beliefs-and respon-
sive to changes in those beliefs. Thus we find over and over in Stoic manuals 
that their advice for dealing with troublesome emotions is little more than persis-
tent advice to get the facts right-to focus on correcting errors in one's beliefs. 
The nature of the final step in the process is not very clear in the texts. At 
least it is not clear to me. Stoics evidently thought that children who developed 
normally would eventually cross a threshold and be transformed in a funda-
mental way-from animals whose conscious behavior was frequently determined 
directly by impulse, emotion, reflex, and routine, into animals whose conscious 
behavior was always directly caused by the beliefs to which they assented. 
(The Stoics apparently thought that this transformation usually occurred at 
about age fourteen. J6 ) What was in dispute among Stoics themselves was the 
precise nature of this transformation, and perhaps the mechanism behind it. 
We have very little evidence about what they thought the mechanism might 
be. One can suppose that something like a critical mass phenomenon might 
occur, so that once a large enough number and range of a child's emotional 
states were supervenient upon beliefs, the frequency and range of such experi-
ence would somehow feed on itself and increase of its own accord. Then if, as 
the Stoics imagined, the child's belief structure naturally tended toward global 
coherence, affective states supervenient on beliefs in a coherent set might be 
in some analogous way coherent (psychologically "consonant" rather than 
dissonant) and perhaps even mutually reinforcing. In that case one might of-
ten expect to find seamless modulation from one emotional state to the next, 
at least when the child is moving through a sequence of closely related beliefs. 
And even in cases of sharp discontinuity (induced, perhaps, by a sudden leap 
from one belief to another that is nowhere in the logical or psychological 
vicinity of the first), one might still expect to find the consequent, disjointed 
emotional states in harmony with one another. Moreover, one might suppose 
that this ever enlarging process might eventually crowd out primal impulses, 
affective reflexes, and spontaneous affect altogether. Perhaps ChrysipplIs held 
a view something like that. But perhaps not. Perhaps he had a mechanism in 
mind that was as original in its way as oikciosis is in its. This seems unlikely if 
only because there does not seem to have been suhsequent discussion of the 
matter. So one is reduced to speculation on this point. But by all accounts 
Chrysippus certainly did hold that the end result of the process was a mature, 
rational agent in whom "non-propositional" emotional states and impulses 
were absent. 
Posidonius, an important member of the Middle Stoa, disagreed. lie held 
that primal impulses and spontaneous emotions were never rooted out. Some 
commentators have thought that he was therefore returning to a Platonic 
account of mental faculties. But it now seems more reasonable to suppose that 
Posidonius remained firmly opposed to Plato on this point, and merely held 
/ 
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the quite reasonable view that primal impulses, affective reflexes, and sponta-
neous emotion operated throughout our adult lives in much the same way 
external stimuli do-as inputs with which we cope. The difference between 
children and mature adults on this score would then be in the swiftness and 
completeness with which their rationality captured such experience and ei-
ther (a) interposed itself as the immediate causal source of our behavior, or (b) 
did that and in addition actually made emotion supervenient upon beliefs. 
This difference would count as a fundamental transformation if, for example, 
primal impulses, affective reflexes, and spontaneous emotion simply could not 
persist and blossom directly into action in healthy, mature adults-if instead, 
as quickly as such things emerged they would be nipped in the bud and re-
placed by propositional attitudes whose power to determine our conduct came 
wholly from our assent to the propositions involved. The mechanism for that 
sort of transformation might be simply that the child's practice of representing 
experience propositionally, once it gets going, quickly becomes imperialistic, 
and eventually operates always, everywhere in the child's experience. And 
then one can Suppose that habituation could increase the speed, accuracy and 
completeness with which children propositionalize their experienceY That 
would eventually lead to a situation in which there is little or no opportunity 
for spontaneous emotion ever to persist, let alone blossom into action. 
Being transformed in that way would not, of course, entail the absence of 
wildly inappropriate emotions. Such emotions in an adult, however, would be 
generated by false or inconsistent beliefs-for example, beliefs that, when as-
sented to, simply replicated or reinforced the motive power of inappropriate 
primal emotion. (Attorney: "You've got to get control of your anger. Think of 
the consequences." Client: "I'm thinking about revenge.") The therapy for them 
would be very different, then, than the therapy for violent and inappropriate 
emotion in a child. In the case of an adult, one would expect standard Stoic 
practice (much like its contemporary descendant, Rational-Emotive Behav-
ior Therapy) to work quite well across the board, because it is the adult's as-
sent to inappropriate beliefs that is ultimately doing the causal work. In the 
case of children, one could have no such across-the-board expectation, and 
might often find that causing the child to "focus on the facts" would have no 
useful effect at all. For adults who are resistant to Stoic therapy, the proper 
Course would be to find ways to get them to attend to the facts. For young 
children, the proper course would be to accelerate the imperialistic develop-
ment of their efforts to capture their experience in propositional terms. 
Concluding Remark 
It may well be that the Stoics overstated the extent to which these two trans-
formations-one in moral motivation and one in the relation between reason 
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and emotion-occurred in the normal course of development from infancy to 
what we would now call early adolescence (that is, age fourteen). The Stoics 
were, of course, vividly aware of the difficulties adults of all ages have in gov-
erning their emotions, and in acting appropriately. So they cannot have meant 
that cognitive and moral development was complete by the age of fourteen, 
and it seems peculiar to insist that even all the fundamental changes would be 
complete by that age. What is evidently missing is a developmental account 
of adolescence, and perhaps a stage theory of young, middle, and old age as 
well. And given the power and originality of the Stoic account of childhood 
development, it is tantalizing to try to imagine what they might have done if 
they had addressed themselves to later stages. But even though wishing is a 
Stoic-approved emotion, 1M perhaps we should simply be grateful for what we 
already have from the Stoic tradition. 
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